Government vulnerability equities processes (VEP)
In one sentence: a vulnerability equities process is a government procedure for deciding whether a newly found, publicly unknown vulnerability is disclosed to the vendor so it can be fixed, or temporarily kept for intelligence, law-enforcement or military use.12
What it is
- United States. The Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process (15 November 2017) applies to vulnerabilities that are “newly discovered and not publicly known”. Its stated primary focus is “to prioritize the public’s interest in cybersecurity”, with disclosure as the outcome “absent a demonstrable, overriding interest” in lawful intelligence, law-enforcement or national-security use.1
- United Kingdom. The Equities Process is operated by GCHQ on behalf of the government. It decides whether vulnerabilities “should be released to allow them to be mitigated or retained so that they can be used for intelligence purposes”. GCHQ states: “The starting position is always that disclosing a vulnerability will be in the national interest.”2
How the published processes work
| Element | United States (2017 charter) | United Kingdom (GCHQ, published 2018) |
|---|---|---|
| Decision body | Equities Review Board of several departments and agencies; coordinated by National Security Council staff1 | Equities Technical Panel → GCHQ Equity Board → Equities Oversight Committee chaired by the CEO of the NCSC2 |
| Escalation | Contested decisions go through the National Security Council process1 | In exceptional cases to Director GCHQ and, if required, the Foreign Secretary2 |
| Review of retained vulnerabilities | “Reassessed annually” until disclosed, public or mitigated1 | Reviewed “at least every twelve months”2 |
| Reporting | An annual report with at least an unclassified executive summary; “may be provided to the Congress”1 | Not stated in the published description2 |
| Disclosure method | Released “when possible within 7 business days” of a decision to disclose1 | Coordinated disclosure following ISO/IEC 29147; no fixed time frame for the vendor’s fix2 |
| Exceptions | Some categories excluded; details in a classified annex1 | E.g. vulnerabilities already assessed by a partner, unsupported software, “vulnerable-by-design” choices2 |
Criteria (summary)
Both processes weigh defensive risk (how widely the product is used, how likely others are to find or exploit the vulnerability, the potential damage, available mitigations) against operational value (intelligence, law-enforcement or military benefit, and whether alternatives exist).12
Established positions
- Governments’ stated position: in most cases disclosure is in the national interest, but temporarily keeping some vulnerabilities is sometimes the only way to obtain vital intelligence or to discover significant intrusions.12
- Oversight: the published texts describe internal boards and senior escalation. Neither published description specifies review by a body outside the executive branch.12 Whether that is sufficient is a policy debate, not a fact this page settles.
See also
Changelog
- 2026-11-15 – created (draft). Open: check whether the US charter has been revised since 2017; add other countries only from published primary texts.
Sources
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The White House, “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States Government”, 2017-11-15 (unclassified charter). https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF (accessed 2026-11-15) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11
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GCHQ, “The Equities Process”, published 2018-11-29, reviewed 2019-03-18. https://www.gchq.gov.uk/information/equities-process (accessed 2026-11-15) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11