The exploit market – economics and regulation
In one sentence: the exploit market is the set of channels through which zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits are found, priced, traded and regulated. It ranges from vendor bug bounties to commercial intrusion-capability suppliers that sell to governments.12
Scope: this page covers economics and policy only. It contains no information on how to buy, sell or obtain exploits.
What it is
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Exploits have value because they are reused. Zero-day exploits are “useful in cyber operations — whether by criminals, militaries, or governments — as well as in defensive and academic settings”.1
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A stockpile loses value slowly. In RAND’s dataset, about 5.7% of a stockpile of zero-day vulnerabilities had been found and disclosed by another party after one year.1 Average life expectancy was 6.9 years.1
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Development is fast once a flaw is found. The median time to develop a working exploit after finding an exploitable vulnerability was 22 days.1
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Costs depend on several factors: time to find a viable vulnerability, time to build and test the exploit, the salaries of the researchers, and the likelihood of having to update the exploit after code changes.1
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Who exploits zero-days, as counted for 2024: GTIG attributed 34 of 75 zero-days exploited in the wild in 2024 to a threat actor. Of those, about 53% (18) went to espionage actors:
- 10 to likely state-sponsored groups;
- 8 to customers of commercial surveillance vendors.
About 15% (5) went to non-state financially motivated groups.3
Regulation and official responses
| Date | Body | Action | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021-11-03 | US Department of Commerce (BIS) | Added four companies to the Entity List. For two, the stated basis is “evidence that these entities developed and supplied spyware to foreign governments that used these tools to maliciously target” officials, journalists, activists and others. For the other two, it is a determination that they “traffic in cyber tools used to gain unauthorized access to information systems”. | 4 |
| 2021-10 | US Department of Commerce | Interim final rule on export controls for certain cybersecurity items. | 4 |
| 2024-02 | UK and France (Pall Mall Process) | Pall Mall Declaration on commercial cyber intrusion capabilities. It is non-binding and built on four pillars: accountability, precision, oversight, transparency. | 2 |
| 2025-04-04 | Pall Mall Process | Voluntary, non-binding Code of Practice for States launched in Paris. Supporters added afterwards include the United States, the Republic of Korea, Finland, Romania, Latvia and Belgium (as listed by the UK FCDO). | 2 |
The companies are named in the cited Commerce press release 4. This page does not repeat the names, because the economics do not depend on them (editorial policy, rule 3).
Established positions
- Disclose or retain. RAND presents its data as input to the policy debate on “stockpiling (i.e., keeping zero-day vulnerabilities private) versus disclosing them to the public”. It does not recommend either.1 See
vulnerability-equities. - Regulate the market. The Pall Mall Process frames commercial intrusion capabilities as a “shared threat”, to be met with responsible-use commitments for states as regulators, customers and users.2
Key facts
- 2024 zero-days attributed to customers of commercial surveillance vendors: 8 (GTIG).3
- Share of a zero-day stockpile rediscovered by others within one year: about 5.7% (RAND, 2017 dataset).1
See also
- Zero-day definitions
- Ransomware economics and cyber insurance
- Harvest now, decrypt later
Changelog
- 2026-10-18 – created (draft). Open: add Wassenaar Arrangement intrusion-software controls (primary text); add court rulings involving commercial spyware only from court documents.
Sources
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L. Ablon, A. Bogart, “Zero Days, Thousands of Nights”, RAND Corporation, RR-1751-RC, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1751.html (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8
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UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “The Pall Mall Process Code of Practice for States”, published 2025-04-04, updated 2025-10-23. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-pall-mall-process-code-of-practice-for-states (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Google Threat Intelligence Group, “Hello 0-Days, My Old Friend: A 2024 Zero-Day Exploitation Analysis”, 2025-04-29. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/2024-zero-day-trends (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2
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US Department of Commerce, “Commerce Adds NSO Group and Other Foreign Companies to Entity List for Malicious Cyber Activities”, 2021-11-03. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/11/commerce-adds-nso-group-and-other-foreign-companies-entity-list (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2 ↩3