Cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) and Q-Day
In one sentence: a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is a quantum computer reliable and large enough to break widely used public-key cryptosystems.1 “Q-Day” is an informal name for the day such a machine first exists.
What it is
- CRQC: “a reliable quantum computer of sufficient size will be able to break some of the most widely used cryptosystems; hence the notion of Cryptographically-Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC)”.1 For its expert survey, the Global Risk Institute (GRI) report uses a specific operational definition: a quantum computer able to break RSA-2048 within 24 hours.1
- Q-Day: an informal term used in industry and media. It has no standardised definition. On qbZero it means the date a CRQC first becomes available to any party, whether or not that is publicly known.
- Current state: the GRI report states that today’s quantum processors “are still far from being CRQCs”.1 The UK NCSC describes the threat as coming from “future large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers”.2
Why it matters for security
- Nobody knows the date. Authorities plan against deadlines rather than a predicted Q-Day. The NCSC asks organisations to complete discovery and planning by 2028, priority migration by 2031 and full migration by 2035.2 NIST’s draft transition plan foresees removing quantum-vulnerable algorithms from its standards by 2035.3
- Data captured today can be decrypted later. Data encrypted now can be recorded and decrypted after Q-Day (“harvest now, decrypt later”). The GRI report states that adversaries “already have access to the technology needed” for such collection.1 See
harvest-now-decrypt-later. - The Mosca inequality. If the time data must stay secret (“shelf-life time”) plus the time needed to migrate (“migration time”) is greater than the time until a CRQC exists (“quantum threat time”), the organisation cannot protect that data for its whole useful life.1
Established positions on timing
| Source | Statement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| GRI Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2024 (32 experts) | Average likelihood of a CRQC within 10 years: about 34% (“optimistic” reading) or about 19% (“pessimistic” reading). Within 5 years: about 14% (optimistic). | Expert survey; authors are from a quantum-security company (evolutionQ)1 |
| UK NCSC | No date for a CRQC given. Ten years is judged sufficient for migration, which leads to the 2035 target. | Government guidance2 |
| NIST | Quantum computers “may be years or decades away”. | Standards body3 |
Key facts
- Lowest published resource estimate for breaking RSA-2048 as of 2026-10-18: fewer than 1 million noisy qubits, less than one week (preprint, 2025).4
- UK migration milestones: 2028, 2031 and 2035.2
See also
- Shor’s algorithm
- Harvest now, decrypt later
- The zero-day lifecycle: Q-Day can be read as a flaw in a whole class of algorithms, exploitable before every system has a fix.
Changelog
- 2026-10-18 – created (draft). Open: check whether a 2025 GRI report has been published; add the US NSA/CNSA 2.0 position.
Sources
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M. Mosca, M. Piani (evolutionQ Inc.), “Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2024 – Executive Summary”, Global Risk Institute, December 2024. https://globalriskinstitute.org/publication/2024-quantum-threat-timeline-report/ (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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UK NCSC, “Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography”, v1.0, 2025-03-20. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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NIST CSRC, “Post-Quantum Cryptography” project page, updated 2026-08-05. https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2
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C. Gidney, “How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits”, arXiv:2505.15917 (preprint), 2025-05-21. https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917 (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩