Wiki / Quantum

Cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) and Q-Day

Type
Read-up
Steward
Chris War
Facts as of
2026-10-18
Next review
2027-04-18
Status
draft

Cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) and Q-Day

In one sentence: a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is a quantum computer reliable and large enough to break widely used public-key cryptosystems.1 “Q-Day” is an informal name for the day such a machine first exists.

What it is

  • CRQC: “a reliable quantum computer of sufficient size will be able to break some of the most widely used cryptosystems; hence the notion of Cryptographically-Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC)”.1 For its expert survey, the Global Risk Institute (GRI) report uses a specific operational definition: a quantum computer able to break RSA-2048 within 24 hours.1
  • Q-Day: an informal term used in industry and media. It has no standardised definition. On qbZero it means the date a CRQC first becomes available to any party, whether or not that is publicly known.
  • Current state: the GRI report states that today’s quantum processors “are still far from being CRQCs”.1 The UK NCSC describes the threat as coming from “future large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers”.2

Why it matters for security

  • Nobody knows the date. Authorities plan against deadlines rather than a predicted Q-Day. The NCSC asks organisations to complete discovery and planning by 2028, priority migration by 2031 and full migration by 2035.2 NIST’s draft transition plan foresees removing quantum-vulnerable algorithms from its standards by 2035.3
  • Data captured today can be decrypted later. Data encrypted now can be recorded and decrypted after Q-Day (“harvest now, decrypt later”). The GRI report states that adversaries “already have access to the technology needed” for such collection.1 See harvest-now-decrypt-later.
  • The Mosca inequality. If the time data must stay secret (“shelf-life time”) plus the time needed to migrate (“migration time”) is greater than the time until a CRQC exists (“quantum threat time”), the organisation cannot protect that data for its whole useful life.1

Established positions on timing

SourceStatementType
GRI Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2024 (32 experts)Average likelihood of a CRQC within 10 years: about 34% (“optimistic” reading) or about 19% (“pessimistic” reading). Within 5 years: about 14% (optimistic).Expert survey; authors are from a quantum-security company (evolutionQ)1
UK NCSCNo date for a CRQC given. Ten years is judged sufficient for migration, which leads to the 2035 target.Government guidance2
NISTQuantum computers “may be years or decades away”.Standards body3

Key facts

  • Lowest published resource estimate for breaking RSA-2048 as of 2026-10-18: fewer than 1 million noisy qubits, less than one week (preprint, 2025).4
  • UK migration milestones: 2028, 2031 and 2035.2

See also

Changelog

  • 2026-10-18 – created (draft). Open: check whether a 2025 GRI report has been published; add the US NSA/CNSA 2.0 position.

Sources

  1. M. Mosca, M. Piani (evolutionQ Inc.), “Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2024 – Executive Summary”, Global Risk Institute, December 2024. https://globalriskinstitute.org/publication/2024-quantum-threat-timeline-report/ (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  2. UK NCSC, “Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography”, v1.0, 2025-03-20. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  3. NIST CSRC, “Post-Quantum Cryptography” project page, updated 2026-08-05. https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩ ↩2

  4. C. Gidney, “How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits”, arXiv:2505.15917 (preprint), 2025-05-21. https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.15917 (accessed 2026-10-18) ↩

Cite as: qbZero Wiki, “Cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) and Q-Day”, as of 2026-10-18. https://qbzero.com/wiki/quantum/crqc-and-q-day/